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FRAMING
How is the USA like a low- income and 
middle- income countries (LMICs)? With 
limited treatment options, no vaccine and 
a chronically underfunded public health 
infrastructure, the USA is confronting the 
COVID-19 pandemic hampered by adversi-
ties typically faced by LMICs. In particular, 
obtaining reliable and timely surveillance 
data to inform public health policy has been 
impeded by persistent shortages of testing 
supplies and inequitable access to testing. 
SARS- CoV-2 testing in March and April 2020 
likely identified only 2%–17% of US infec-
tions.1
These deficiencies in testing mean that 
the USA lacks accurate surveillance data 
for tracking SARS- CoV-2 outbreaks in its 
communities. LMICs long ago confronted 
and adapted to similar difficulties by 
pioneering ‘sentinel surveillance’ systems. 
Sentinel surveillance is the study of disease 
rates in a specific cohort to estimate trends 
in a larger population. When properly 
implemented, sentinel surveillance systems 
offer an effective method for leveraging 
limited resources to monitor disease spread. 
In this commentary, we argue that rigor-
ously designed and thoughtfully imple-
mented sentinel surveillance systems are a 
cost- effective and logistically viable strategy 
to monitor local SARS- CoV-2 transmission in 
the contemporary USA. We use the example 
of HIV sentinel surveillance in sub- Saharan 
Africa during the early decades of the AIDS 
epidemic as an exemplar.
OVERVIEW
Sentinel surveillance systems serve multiple 
functions. The method enables prompt and 
flexible monitoring and investigation of 
suspected public health problems and the 
ability to target public health interventions 
more effectively.2 Benefits include early 
warnings of growing outbreaks, quantifica-
tion of the size and scope of an epidemic, 
short- term or long- term evaluation of 
control efforts and stimulating political 
and social action. Sentinel surveillance can 
identify behavioural risk factors associated 
with transmission as well as identify core 
transmitters (reservoirs); estimate prev-
alence and incidence trends in specific 
demographic risk groups and geographic 
areas; and help anticipate future resources 
needed to cope with an epidemic. However, 
some sentinel surveillance systems are more 
accurate and functional than others. Below 
we describe five key features that charac-
terise the most successful sentinel surveil-
lance programmes.
Summary box
 ► With limited treatment options, no vaccine and a
chronically underfunded public health infrastructure, 
the USA is confronting the COVID-19 pandemic ham-
pered by adversities typically faced by low- income
and middle- income countries (LMICs).
 ► LMICs long ago confronted and adapted to simi-
lar difficulties by pioneering ‘sentinel surveillance’
systems.
 ► Sentinel surveillance is the study of disease rates
in a specific cohort to estimate trends in a larger
population.
 ► When properly implemented, sentinel surveillance
systems offer an effective method for leveraging
limited resources to monitor disease spread.
 ► In this viewpoint, we describe five key features
that characterise the most successful sentinel sur-
veillance programmes and argue that rigorously
designed and thoughtfully implemented sentinel
surveillance systems are a cost- effective and logis-
tically viable strategy to monitor local SARS- CoV-2
transmission in the contemporary USA.
 ► We use the example of HIV sentinel surveillance in
sub- Saharan Africa during the early decades of the
AIDS epidemic as an exemplar.
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FIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL SENTINEL 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMME
First, the sentinel population should be representative 
of some high- risk target population or generate preva-
lence or incidence rates that correlate with rates of key, 
defined target populations. For instance, during the HIV 
epidemic of the late 1980s, public health officials working 
in LMICs popularised the strategy of testing leftover, or 
‘remnant’, blood from routine syphilis testing among 
pregnant women attending antenatal clinics (ANCs). In 
the sub- Saharan Africa of the 1980s and 1990s, hetero-
sexual vaginal intercourse was a dominant mode of HIV 
transmission.3 Thus, many countries chose patients with 
sexually transmitted infection (STI) and ANC attendees 
as their sentinel groups to monitor HIV seroprevalence.4 
A convenience sample of low- risk people, for example, 
elderly people shopping at the market, would have failed 
to reflect HIV prevalence meaningfully. An added benefit 
of ANC serosurveillance is the potential identification of 
HIV- positive pregnant people, a clinically relevant popu-
lation eligible for intervention to prevent mother- to- child 
HIV transmission.
Second, an effective sentinel surveillance system should 
engage an easily accessible population and be econom-
ical. During the late 1980s, WHO’s Global Program on 
AIDS and affiliated research institutions developed 
HIV sentinel surveillance in large part because of the 
high costs of other potentially suitable methods such as 
population- based survey studies. Instead, as described 
above, researchers analysed remnant blood samples from 
ANC attendees: antenatal clinics were easy to locate, 
represented the sentinel population well and were acces-
sible to researchers. Furthermore, many developing 
countries adopted a strategy known as unlinked anon-
ymous testing (UAT).5 Patients with ANC were neither 
consented nor told the results of their HIV tests. UAT 
dramatically simplified the logistics of and reduced 
the price of ANC sentinel serosurveillance. Addition-
ally, because of stigma around HIV testing in that era, 
UAT likely reduced biases that would have been present 
with voluntary testing. However, UAT also raises ethical 
concerns, as discussed later.
Third, a sentinel surveillance system should be able 
to test predetermined population groups in a regular, 
consistent and sustainable way.4 In monitoring HIV infec-
tion, when countries were obtaining information from 
ANC and STI clinics, the sentinel groups, sites and study 
procedures became established and regular.4 Consistent 
and predictable data generation created an infrastructure 
that allowed results to be used rapidly and confidently in 
HIV- related public health decision making.
A fourth characteristic of an effective sentinel surveil-
lance system is the extent to which it signals changes in 
transmission dynamics. For example, if HIV transmis-
sion in sub- Saharan Africa began to be dominated by 
blood transfusions or intravenous drug use, then ANC 
serosurveillance would decrease in its utility. Relatedly, 
well- defined populations with unique risk profiles may 
reflect part of transmission dynamics while missing other 
changes in transmission. Therefore, triangulating among 
multiple sentinel groups or continuously evaluating the 
performance of current sentinel groups will enhance 
surveillance effectiveness.
Finally, one must consider the ethics of sentinel surveil-
lance, especially systems that do not report individualised, 
or ‘named’, test results back to those tested. For instance, 
UAT- based ANC HIV serosurveillance was constantly 
questioned on ethical grounds. Some viewed this strategy 
as inconsistent with the core bioethical principle of 
respect for persons. Not consenting patients withdraws 
the autonomy of a pregnant woman to make informed 
choices about participating in surveillance- related 
testing.3 It is important to note that the ethical balance 
of UAT approaches will change as treatment and trans-
mission prevention options evolve. UAT becomes more 
ethically untenable once results of tests have actionable 
prevention or treatment implications. As well- tolerated 
treatment options for HIV became more available glob-
ally, UAT policy changed as a result.
SENTINEL SURVEILLANCE AND COVID-19
Recently published studies analyse seroprevalence of 
SARS- CoV-2 using UAT approaches. All these studies 
meet two criteria described above. First, they are acces-
sible, timely and economical. Second, because seroprev-
alence is of limited clinical utility for most people and 
named testing is largely available in the USA when clin-
ically indicated, we believe UAT serosurveillance is ethi-
cally justified. However, some recent studies fall short on 
the three other criteria described: inadequately justified 
sentinel groups; relying on cross- sectional data rather 
than consistent, sustainable sampling over time; and 
not evaluating how well results reflect actual prevalence 
or transmission dynamics.1 6 Flannery et al7 improve on 
other studies by selecting a well- defined sentinel group: 
hospitalised delivering babies. While Stadlbauer et al6 
argues that pregnant people may under- represent prev-
alence, it is just as likely that parturient patients are at 
average or high risk because reproductive- aged women 
have many social contacts, are disproportionately likely 
to be ‘essential workers’ in caregiving fields and socialise 
with other young people who may unwittingly transmit 
the virus because they are asymptomatic or have mild 
symptoms. The utility of different sentinel populations in 
representing SARS- CoV-2 prevalence and transmission is 
an unsettled question that demands empirical research.
CONCLUSION
LMICs have long contended with infectious diseases 
threats and limited treatment and prevention resources. 
Communities in the USA now find themselves in a 
situation where they can learn from the ingenuity and 
successes of LMICs. Monitoring local SARS- CoV-2 trans-
mission through sentinel surveillance will allow public 
officials to relax and tighten public health restrictions 
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in a targeted manner that may minimise public fatigue 
and hardship while also minimising transmission. Even as 
COVID-19 vaccines are rolled out throughout the USA,8 9 
sentinel surveillance can also help monitor the effective-
ness of vaccination programmes in the sentinel popula-
tion. Thoughtfully designed sentinel surveillance systems 
are a cost- effective part of a larger strategy to mitigate the 
spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in resource- limited 
settings.
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